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The adequacy of weak theories of arithmetic as axiomatic bases for Computer Science is 
investigated. The formal system studied in Lipton (in “Proceedings, 19 th Symposium of the 
Foundations of Computer Science,” pp. 193-200, 1978) is shown to be inadequate for 
Computer Science in the sense that it has a model with the following defects: (i) finite (i.e., 
bounded) sets may be undecidable in the model, (ii) standard recursively enumerable sets 
which are undecidable may have linear time decision procedures in the model, and 
(iii) programs which simply loop a bounded number of times may not terminate in the model 
(demonstrating the inadequacy of the formal system for proving program termination). 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In recent papers, Lipton [23], DeMillo and Lipton [5,6], Homer and Reif [ 181, 
Joseph [ 191, and Joseph and Young [20] have considered the consequences of using 
formal systems which are weaker than Peano Arithmetic for investigating and 
analyzing problems which arise in Computer Science. In another paper, O’Donnell 
[27] has shown that certain natural termination statements about programs written in 
strongly typed languages are independent of full Peano Arithmetic. The O’Donnell 
and Lipton papers follow an earlier suggestion of Hartmanis [ 151 and Hartmanis and 
Hopcroft [ 141 that the P = NP question and similar questions may be independent of 
Peano Arithmetic. However, the O’Donnell and Lipton papers established the first 
“natural” independence results for Computer Science. (These results followed the 
results of Paris and Harrington establishing the independence of an extension of the 
finite version of Ramsey’s Theorem from Peano Arithmetic [28, 291. McAloon [26] 
contains a collection of articles discussing and extending the Paris and Harrington 
results.) 
In [23], Lipton shows that certain statements of general complexity theory which 
are provable in Peano Arithmetic are nevertheless independent of weaker, restricted 
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subsets of Peano Arithmetic which do not permit the use of complicated, 
“nonconstructive,” forms of inductive reasoning. Lipton argues from this that because 
Computer Scientists do not normally (and perhaps should not) rely on such 
nonconstructive proof methods, such statements, which require more complicated 
inductions for their proofs, should be considered to be outside the proper domain of 
Computer Science. He argues that such independence results help explain why these 
results of general complexity theory may have little relevance to Computer Science. 
In general he argues that a “constructive” subset of the Peano axioms should be 
adequate for Computer Science. 
On the other hand, in recent work by O’Donnell [27] (and in related work by 
Fortune [9]) it is show that for strongly typed languages such as MODEL, the 
question of termination for what in less sophisticated languages would be trivial 
straight-line code is independent of an extension of the standard axioms for Peano 
Arithmetic. O’Donnell’s work raises the disturbing possibility that increased 
programming language sophistication will lead to inherently difftcult program 
management and analysis. To overcome this difftculty, O’Donnell suggests that it 
may be necessary to increase the power of the formal metasystem (e.g., Peano 
Arithmetic) which is normally used for program analysis and verification. 
Although there has been considerable additional work discussing limitations of 
formal proof techniques for the theory of computation [8, 11, 371 and for Computer 
Science [ 1, 12-15, 301, these papers show only very general consequences of incom- 
pleteness: the stated results hold for all sufficiently powerful formal systems for 
Computer Science. Only the work of O’Donnell and of Lipton directly addresses the 
question of just how powerful axioms for Computer Science should be, and these two 
authors make rather radically different suggestions. 
This paper addresses the latter question: How powerful should a set of axioms be if 
it is to be adequate for Computer Science? In particular, in this paper we investigate 
the adequacy of the system of [23] as a formal system for Computer Science. 
2. RECURSIVE DECIDABILIT~ AND ALGORITHM EFFICIENCY IN BASIC NUMBER 
THEORY 
The metasystem studied by Lipton is obtained by taking as axioms all the f12 
theorems’ of Peano Arithmetic. This subtheory is called “Constructive Arithmetic” 
by Lipton. However, it has been studied extensively by earlier authors, [ 10, 17, 25, 
31, 331, and is now generally referred to as Basic Number Theory (B). Since, 
“constructive” often has a different meaning, for example as used by Heyting [ 161 or 
by Constable [3], we shall follow the earlier convention. As Lipton points out, B is a 
‘There is some leeway possible in the defining syntax of the class of 17, statements, although the 
definition is invariant under reasonable changes [ 171. Our results will hold for any syntactically 
recursive class such that if (Vx)(3y) a(x, JJ) is any true formula of the class, then there is a total recursive 
function f such that o(x,f(x)) is true for all x. 
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fairly powerful subsystem of Peano Arithmetic. For example, it is adequate for 
proving the consistency of every subtheory of arithmetic obtained by taking only the 
Z, axioms of Peano Arithmetic. It is also the case that within B one can prove not 
only the equivalence of all the standard models of computation, but also that they are 
polynomially related. That is, one can prove that the class of functions computable 
by Turing machines, RAMS or Markov algorithms is exactly the class of partial 
recursive functions and that the computation times are polynomially invariant. 
Therefore within models of B a function is easily computable if and only if there is a 
Turing machine which easily computes it. B also properly contains those simple, 
finitely axiomatizable theories, such as Robinson’s System [34], known to be 
adequate for obtaining the G&lel incompleteness results. On the other hand, Lipton 
shows that this system is not adequate for establishing the existence of a (provably) 
decidable set such that neither the set nor its complement has an infinite easy to 
decide subset. In addition, he shows that B is inadequate for obtaining the Blum 
speed-up results for standard sets.2 
In interpreting these results, Lipton states that “It is standard folklore that all the 
normal work of mathematicians who deal with finite objects can be proved in this 
theory” and that “we as Computer Scientists rarely employ nonconstructive 
methods” (i.e., those not formalizable within B). He goes on to argue that the 
strength of B serves as evidence that complexity theoretic results which are 
independent of B are perhaps not relevant to Computer Science, or in any case 
require proof techniques which are more complex than those of interest to Computer 
Scientists. However, we suspect that such independence results will often suggest the 
independence of even more basic statements. The results of this paper illustrate that 
this is the case not only for B but also for slightly stronger theories. By constructing 
a model in which some undecidable sets become decidable in linear-time and in which 
closely related bounded sets are undecidable, we show that, in some sense, theories 
like B are inadequate for distinguishing very fundamental concepts of decidability 
and algorithm efficiency. We believe that results such as ours indicate the inadequacy 
of such weak theories as an axiomatic basis for Computer Science: very few 
Computer Scientists will accept as adequate axioms which allow bounded sets to be 
undecidable and allow undecidable sets to be decidable in linear-time. 
On the other hand, the fact that such simple decidability and complexity 
statements as well as the more abstract results discussed in [23] are independent of 
such weak theories may still be of interest for: (i) better understanding exactly how 
powerful proof tools must be in Computer Science, (ii) classifying the “proof- 
theoretic” complexity of results in Computer Science, and (iii) perhaps as precursors 
for independence results either for richer axiom systems or for more interesting 
statements. Similar sentiments are expresed in [6]. 
Before presenting our results, it is useful to discuss the proof of Lipton’s result and 
extensions which have been made to it. The chief result of [23] is that it is consistent 
with B to believe that every (provably) recursive set, R, has an infinite easy to decide 
* For somewhat related work, see [37, Theorem 31. 
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subset either in R or in R. In [22], Leivant extends this by observing that the set need 
not be provably recursive and by showing that even then the result is independent not 
just of B, but of the stronger theory, called Tn,, whose axioms are all true n2 
arithmetic statements. (That is, all true sentences of the form (Vx)($) u(x, y), with CJ 
bounded.) Lipton’s and Leivant’s proofs use essentially the same techniques-both 
use a compactness argument to construct a nonstandard model in which either the set 
R or its complement has an infinite easily decidable subset. Both of their proofs show 
slightly more than is stated in their theorems. For this reason and because our proof 
builds on theirs, it is useful to sketch a proof of their results. The outline which we 
present will omit details in an attempt to point out intuitively what are the essential 
features of their argument and to motivate our proof which follows. 
We begin with the standard model of Peano arithmetic, N, and form a nonstandard 
model, N,, of the theory of N which contains a nonstandard constant a,. Next we 
consider the sequence { g’(a,): i E N) for a monotonically increasing, total recursive 
function g. Clearly, for any such function this sequence is a subset of N,. Suppose 
that we choose g to be a total recursive function which majorizes every provably 
recursive function and we form the structure M = {x: x E N, & x ( g’(a,) for some 
i E NJ. Since g majorizes the Skolem functions for all of the provable ZI, sentences, 
M is a model of B. Alternatively, if we choose g to be a nonstandard total recursive 
function which majorizes every standard total recursive function and form M in the 
same manner, then M is a model of Tm,. (In this case, care must be taken in the 
construction of N, to ensure that a program (index) for g is less than g’(a,) for some 
i E N since later in the proof we will require that g be computable in M.) At this 
point some observations can be made: 
First let G = { g’(a,): i 5 a,} and let F be any subset of G. In N, there is a number 
(in effect a table) bF such that for all i 6 a,, g’(u,) E F iff pi 1 b,, where pi is the ith 
prime. But no matter what F is, b, is the product of fewer than a, primes, and hence 
b, E M. In fact, by the choice of g, b, < a,, Now in the model M, consider any set S. 
Either S or S intersects G infinitely often. Without loss of generality, suppose the 
former. Then S f7 G is just the restriction to the set M of some subset F of G. Thus 
for this set F, x E S n G iff x E F. Since g grows at least exponentially, if we also 
choose g with the additional property that it is linearly honest, then given x E M, in 
linear-time we can test whether there is an i E N such that g’(q) = x and if one is 
found, we can then use b, to test whether x E S in linear-time. Thus in effect, 
Lipton’s and Leivant’s proofs really show that there is a model of B or Tn, in which 
every set has an infinite easily decidable subset in either it or its complement. 
Of course if the set S is arithmetically definable, then the interpretation of its 
arithmetic definition in the model N, when restricted to the set M need not be the 
same as the interpretation of its arithmetic definition in the model M. On the other 
hand, if S is (provably) recursive then S behaves nicely with respect to membership 
in both N and M. That is, 
foreveryxEN,Nt=xESiffM!=xxSS; 
foreveryxEM,M~xESiffN,~xxS. 
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The first of these sentences is true simply because our axioms include all of the true 
(or provable in the case of B) 172 sentences. The second follows from the fact that g 
majorizes all of the (provably in the case of B) recursive functions, hence for any 
standard recursive set S it majorizes the runtime of a decision procedure for S, 
forcing it to behave in the same manner in M as in N,. 
In general, one can only show that a set behaves nicely with respect to membership 
if the set is (provably) recursive. Nevertheless, we will show that there are sets which 
are undecidable in every model of PA but in models similar to M not only contain 
infinite easily decidable subsets but are themselves easily decidable. What’s more they 
behave nicely with respect to membership. 
The class of undecidable sets which we construct will be a subclass of the simple 
sets. In this regard it is interesting to note that the most extensively studied models 
for B and Tn, are the existentially complete models. It is well known that in passing 
from the standard model to existentially complete models of Tn, the complements of 
all simple sets become bounded but remain undecidable ([ 171). Since we want a 
model in which undecidable sets remain infinite and coinfinite but become rapidly 
decidable, and since we will be working with simple sets, the models we construct will 
not be existentially complete. It is also the case that in the existentially complete 
models the natural numbers are bounded and definable but neither recursive nor 
recursively enumerable, while in our model they are recursively enumerable in 
increasing order but not recursive. Nevertheless, logicians familiar with B and Tn, 
will f?nd results such as ours not surprising. 
We now state our main result: 
THEOREM. There exists a provably (in PA) undecidable set S and a model M of 
Tn, such that: 
[A] In M, S is infinite, coinfinite, and decidable in linear-time; 
[B] In M, there exists ajinite (bounded) set F which is definable in L(M) but 
is undecidable in M. Furthermore, in M, F is recursively enumerable in increasing 
order and can be put in effective one-to-one correspondence with S. 
[C ] Finally, S behaves nicely with respect to membership if the domain of the 
model is restricted to standard elements. That is, if a E N then M k a E S if and only 
ifNkaES. 
Outline of the proof. The details of the proof are presented in Sections 3 and 4, 
however, a brief outline of the proof is given here. As a point of departure, we recall 
the fact mentioned earlier that in existentially complete models of Tn, the 
complements of all simple sets become finite. This suggests that with luck we should 
be able to force some subclasses of simple sets to be infinite and coinfinite but still 
rapidly decidable in some models of T,,,. Subclasses of simple sets have been exten- 
sively studied in the literature.3 Unfortunately, none of these subclases seems exactly 
tailored to our needs, so we introduce still another subclass of simple sets: 
“See, for example, 141, [7] or [35]. 
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2.1. DEFINITION. A set S is still-another-simple-set if there is an index (program) 
e such that the domain of qe = S and for every linearly honest, strictly monotonically 
increasing, total function h which grows at least as rapidly as k, * x3 (where k, is a 
constant depending on e) and for every integer n there exist elements t,, t, ,..., t, of S 
such that for all i < n: 
(1) t,>n, 
(2) ti+ 1 = h(ti)9 
(3) (vX)[tf < X < ti+l *X E S], 
(4) (VX)[X < ti &X E S j I, < ti+ I].” 
Such sets are obviously recursively enumerable, however they are all undecidable; 
they are in fact hypersimple. However, given a still-another-simple-set, S, it is not 
hard to construct a model M of Tn, in which S is decidable in linear-time. One first 
constructs a nonstandard model, N,, of full arithmetic by adding new constants a,, 
aI9 a,,..., axioms which force 
(1) ai + I = d4 
(2) a, E S, 
(3) (VX)[fli<x<a,+,~xES], 
(4) (Vx)[x < a, 8z x E S * Q,(x) < Ui+ 11, 
and axioms which force g to be a nonstandard but honest monotone recursive 
function which, in the model N,, majorizes every standard recursive function. Next if 
we let 
then in the same fashion as Leivant, by using the fact that g majorizes all standard 
total recursive functions, we can easily show that M is a nonstandard model of Tn,. 
Property (4) above then asserts that g majorizes the runtime of @,, making S 
decidable. 
To complete the proof of part [A] of the main theorem, we must of course know 
that still-another-simple-set exists. The construction of such a set is by a 
straightforward, purely recursion theoretic, moveable markers argument included in 
Section 4. 
To prove part [B] of the theorem, we show that one can define in L(M) a finite set 
F which is not decidable in the model M of Tn,. There are at least two definitions of 
finiteness. One is that a set is finite if it is bounded by some natural number (possibly 
a nonstandard one). A second is that a set is finite if it can be put in one-to-one 
4 A function h is linearly honest if its runtime is bounded by some constant multiple.of its value. The 
reader may assume without loss of generality that the measure Cp used here behaves like Turing machine 
time. The restriction requiring h(x) > k, * x3 is added for technical convenience in the proof and could 
be eliminated. The notion of immunity used here has some similarities to those used in busy beaver 
constructions 141, and to those used by Leivant [22], and Young [36]. 
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correspondence with a natural number. Normally, these definitions are equivalent. 
However, this is not the case in T,,. In fact, within the model M the set F can be put 
in one-to-one correspondence with the set s which is cofinal in the model. Our set F 
is finite only in the sense that it is bounded by Q, . 
The definition of the finite set F is strongly tied to the decision procedure for the 
simple set S. We use the following program to enumerate the elements of F: 
2.2. DEFINITION. 
Program P: 
BEGIN 
SETy=O andx=-1; 
REPEAT 
SETx=x+l; 
IFxESTHEN 
(PRINT y and SET y =y + 1); 
UNTIL false 
END 
From this program we define F to be {y 1 P prints JJ}. For the proof to work it is 
necessary to show that P is a program in M and that the run-time for each iteration 
of the program is in M if the value of x is in M. 
Because M is a model of all true l& sentences, we can show that in M bounded 
sets with no maximal element cannot be recursive (a limited form of the Overspill 
Principle). Thus F cannot be recursive. (Similarly, if we change the above program P 
to P by replacing the test“x E s” by “x E s& x > a,” then P prints N, and N is 
undecidable for the same reason.) 
In addition to being “pathological” because it is a bounded set which is not 
decidable, F is also “pathological” because, although F is undecidable, the program P 
enumerates F in increasing order in M. 
The program P can also be used to illustrate that standard techniques for proving 
program termination do no always work in models of Tn,. For a decision procedure 
d, let P(d, z) be the following program: 
Program P(d, z): 
BEGIN 
SETy=O andx=-1; 
REPEAT 
SETx=x+ 1; 
IF d(x) returns “true” THEN 
(PRINTy and SETy=y+ 1); 
UNTIL y > z. 
END 
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In any model of PA in which d has the following properties, 
(i) d is a decision procedure which always terminates, 
(ii) (W]4 ) t x re urns “true” * (3y > x)[d(y) returns “true”]], 
(iii) (3x) [d(x) returns “true”], 
P(d, z) terminates. However this need not be the case for Tn,, since there are decision 
procedures for which the above program fails to halt in M. (It might be noted, 
however, that in these cases the runtimes are in N, -M, and so the programs halt in 
N, although they do not halt in M.) 
2.3. COROLLARY. [A] Suppose that C is any class of decision procedures then, 
PA I- “If d E C and d satisfies (i), (ii) and (iii) then for all integers z, P(d, z) 
terminates,” 
[B] There exists a nonempty class C of decision procedures such that, 
Tn, # “If d E C and d satisfies (i), (ii) and (iii) then for all integers z, P(d, z) 
terminates.” 
Proof [A]: Since the decision procedure d is assumed to be total and for larger 
and larger inputs x returns the value “true” the loop index y is continually 
incremented. Hence eventually y becomes greater than z and the loop terminates. This 
argument can be formalized in PA which completes the proof. 
[B]: Consider the model M constructed earlier and suppose that z = a, and d 
is a decision procedure for s such as the decision procedure which was outlined. 
There are fewer than a, elements in g so despite the fact that the loop index y is 
continually incremented it never becomes greater than a, and hence the loop does not 
terminate in M. So if we take C to be any syntactically (i.e., arithmetically) definable 
class of decision procedures which includes this decision procedure for gthen [B] of 
the corollary follows. The fact that such a class can be defined within the language 
for PA is verified at the end of the proof of parts [A] and [C] of Theorem 3.1. I 
3. PROOF OF THE MAIN THEOREM 
3.1. THEOREM. Let S be a recursively enmerable set. If S is still-another-simple- 
set then there exists a model, M, of Tn, such that: 
]A] In M, S is decidable in linear-time; 
[B] In M, there exists a finite (bounded) set F which is definable in L(M) but 
is undecidable in M. Furthermore, in M, F is recursively enumerable in increasing 
order and can be put in eflective one-to-one correspondence with S. 
[C] Finally, S behaves nicely with respect to membership if the domain of the 
model is restricted to standard elements. That is, $a E N then Mk a E S tf and only 
tfNi= a E S. 
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Proof of [A] and [Cl. Let S be a fixed still-another-simple-set and let e be an 
index (program) such that the domain of qe = S and (Pi satisfies Definition 2.1. Since 
S is recursively enumerable there is Z, formula such that x E S iff (3~) s(x, y). We 
begin by constructing a model of Tn, in which S is easily decidable. 
One can construct nonstandard models of Tn, from the standard model by adding 
new nonstandard constants and closing the structure under the total recursive 
functions. This technique has been refined by Hirschefeld and Wheeler [ 171 to 
construct nonstandard models of Tn, which have a variety of interesting properties. 
Similarly, any structure closed under all of the total recursive functions is a model of 
Tn,. This fact and techniques similar to those of Hirschfeld and Wheeler have been 
used by Kirby and Paris [21], by Lipton [23], and by Leivant [22], and we use them 
here. 
To the theory and language of N we add new constant symbols to produce a 
nonstandard model of Th(w5, N,, that contains a (nonstandard) total recursive 
function p, which majorizes all of the standard total recursive functions. Then a 
restriction, M, of N, is shown to be a model of Tn, and S is shown to be easily 
decidable in M. 
Let g, a,, a,, a,,... be constant symbols not in L(N). In our construction g will be 
an index (program) and og will denote the function which it computes. For each 
n 2 1, let r, be the following collection of formulas: 
Axioms which guarantee that ‘pg is an honest, strictly monotone total recursive 
function which majorizes all of the standard total recursive functions and has a 
quickly testable predicate: 
(1) The predicate which says that “o,(x) = y” can be checked in linear-time. 
(2) v)& + 1) > cp,(x). 
(3) (pg is relatively honest. That is, Q,(x) 5 k * Iq,(x)j for some integer k. 
(4) (pg majorizes the first n total recursive functions. That is, let r,, r, ,... 
be a (noneffective) indexing of the true n, sentences of PA and define, 
ti(x) = (miny)[oi(x, U)], where ri = VX FlyOi(X, _Y). 
Then, &lZO (VX) V,(X) 2 ti(x). 
Axioms which relate ‘pg to the ai)s and which guarantee that the a:s are in s: 
(5) g 5 a,, (this forces the program g to be relatively small) 
(6) &YZj ai+ 1 = Vg(ai)v 
(7) &;=oUi E S, 
(8) &1~~ (VX)[U~ < X < Ui+ I JX E S], 
(9) &~LI~(VX)[X<Ui&XES*@,(X)<Ui+,]* 
Finally, we define r =def U, r,. 
’ Th(N) is the theory of the standard model N, i.e., Th(N) is the set of all sentences true in the 
standard model. 
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3.2. LEMMA. There exists a nonstandard model, N, , of Th(N) + r. 
Proof. By the compactness theorem it is sufficient to show that for any finite list, 
t,, t, ,***, t, 
of the total recursive functions defined above and any finite collection of axioms r, 
there is, in the standard model N, a total recursive function os which satisfies r,,. 
Given any finite list of total recursive functions, there is certainly an honest, strictly 
monotone total recursive function which majorizes all the functions on the list. By 
making v)* sufficiently large we can assume that the predicate “cp,(x) = y” is linearly 
testable. Thus, given n, let (Do be such an honest function which majorizes t,, t1 ,..., t,. 
Clearly (ps satisfies (l)-(4) above. (Since r will force o8 to majorize every standard 
total recursive function, any model satisfying (l)-(4) will be nonstandard.) By the 
definition of still-another-simple-sets, for this same v)# there are constants a,, a, ,..., a,, 
satisfying (5)-(9) above. 1 
We now restrict the domain of the model N, and show that this restriction forms a 
model of Tn,. Let it4 = {x 1 N, +x < ai for some i). Note that A4 is closed under + 
and * in the sense of N,, (this follows from the fact that x * x 5 (p,(x)) and note that 
axiom schema 5 guarantees that g is in M. It is easy to verify that our construction of 
M forces all of axiom schemas (l)-(9) to hold in the model M. In addition, we claim 
that M with this interpretation of t and * is a model of T,,: 
3.3. LEMMA. Ifrel7, and N k 5 then Mb 5. (Therefore M k Tnz.) 
Proof. If r E 17, then r = Vx3ya(x, y) where cr is a bounded formula. There is a 
total recursive function t such that (Vx) a(x, t(x)). But in N, , IJJ~ majorizes t, and 
since M is closed under o, the sentence must be true in M also. 1 
The following lemmas show that the set S is nicely behaved with respect to 
membership as the domain of the model is restricted or extended. 
3.4. LEMMA. If xE N then M+xE S 5fjTNbxE S. 
Proof. This lemma simply follows from the fact that S is recursively enumerable: 
Note that x E S iff (3~) s(x, y), where s(x, y) is the quantifier free predicate 
introduced earlier. So for each n EN either, 
W sh .Y) or NY> 1 s(n, Y> 
is true. Since Mb Tn2, whichever sentence is true in N is true in M. Therefore the set 
S behaves with respect to membership the same way in M as it does in N. 1 
3.5. LEMMA. IfxEMthenMkxES~fN,~xES. 
Proof. If M F x E S then N, F x E S since x E S is a C, sentence and Z, 
sentences are preserved under extensions. To show the converse, suppose that x E M 
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and N, k x E S. Since x E A4 there is an i such that x < a,. Axiom 9 tells us that 
Q,(X) < Ui+, and since a,+ 1 E M, Mb x E S. 1 
3.6. LEMMA. In M, there is a linear-time decision procedure for S. 
Proof: First observe that by Axiom 9, if x ( a, then x E S iff Q,(x) < a,. On the 
other and, if x 2 aO, then x E S iff x is not equal to any a,. Thus in the model M, we 
can test for membership in S as follows: 
If x < a,, then x E S iff Q,(x) < a,. 
Otherwise, compute a,,, ~,(a,), q$(aJ,... until either an i is found such that 
&a,,) = x or @,(~&a,)) > k * 1x1, where k is the constant which determines the 
(linear) honesty of (pp. The number of iterations of the last computation is certainly 
bounded by a, so that the total difficulty of the above computation is clearly bounded 
by max( a I, a, * k * (xl) which is linear in the model M. 1 
A more careful analysis observes that because ‘pp grows so very rapidly, (a,1 < f 
[u,+~I for all i, so that max{a,, 2k * [xl} is a better bound. Although we forego the 
proof here, the decision procedure for those x < a,, can be stored in a table which is 
finite in M and which is given by a program whose index is less than a,. Doing this 
will bring the bound down to 2k * 1x1. (Note that k is a standard integer.) 
The proof of Corollary 2.3 [B] required that we be able to syntactically define (i.e., 
define within the language of PA) a class of decision procedures which includes the 
decision procedure outlined above, but modified to decide S. The definition of the 
class is dependent on four variables e, a, g and k. We will say that d E C if and only 
if 3e, a, g, k such that d is a well-formed program which consists only of statements 
which perform the following: 
Given x, d tests whether x < a. 
If x < a then d tests whether Q,(x) < o,(a). 
If Q,(x) < q,(a) then d returns “false.” 
If Q,(X) 1 o,(a) then d returns “true.” 
If x 2 a then 
d computes pi(a) 
until o:(u) = x or @,(&a)) > k * Ix I. 
If an i is found such that q:(a) =x then d returns “true,” 
If an i is found such that @&$a)) > k * 1x1 then d returns “false.” 
Clearly, the above description yields an arithmetic definition of a class C of programs 
which includes a decision procedure for S. 
The Existence of Undecidable Finite Sets, Proof of Theorem 3.1 [B] 
The bounded set F and the program P which prints (and defines) F within M were 
defined in Definition 2.2, To analyze P’s behavior and how P defines F in the model 
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A4, it is convenient to change P to P’, a program with domain F which enumerates s 
in increasing order: 
Program P’(z): 
BEGIN 
SETy=O andx=-1; 
REPEAT 
SETx=x+ 1; 
IFxESTHEN SETy=y+ 1; 
UNTIL y > z; 
PRINT x. 
END 
It is clear that P’ computes a monotonic function whose range is some initial 
segment of ,? in M. To see that the range of P’ includes all of 5 in the model M, we 
note that to write an element c of s, P’ requires an input z which will certainly be 
less than c. P’(z) will have to test all elements x 5 c for membership in ,?. However, 
this latter membership test can be made linear in the model A4, so in M, P’(z) will 
require O(c*) steps. Since our axioms guarantee that p’g majorizes x2, c* is less than 
o,(c) for all nonstandard elements c, and since the model M is closed under the 
function (pg, program P operates successfully within the model M to enumerate all of 
R (Using the same techniques as those for deciding S, both S and s can also be 
enumerated in increasing order in time which is linear in the output.) 
F is the domain of the function computed by P’, and it remains to show that F is 
not decidable in the model M. (The program P’ can easily be modified so that our 
proof shows that N is also undecidable.) We begin by observing that in i&f, F clearly 
has fewer than 24, elements since it is in one-to-one correspondence with % Hence F 
has fewer than a, elements and is therefore bounded by a,. Since s is cofinal in 44, it 
is clear that neither F (nor N) can have a largest element, so we may complete the 
proof by showing that in M no bounded set without a largest element can be 
recursive. 
To show this, suppose that F is any nonempty set which in M is recursive, 
bounded, and has no largest element. Let a be any (nonstandard) bound on F. Then 
the following set, F’, will also be recursive, 
as is the complement T of F’. But if T is recursive, or even recursively enumarable, it 
is defined by a formula of the form (3~) u(x, y, c), where c is a (vector of) (possibly) 
nonstandard elements of M and u is a bounded formula. But then the formula 
(VW)(VX)[(3Y) c+,Y, w) * (3J)[@9YP w)&(Vz <Y) ~4x7 ZT WI11 
is certainly true in N and since it is a f12 formula it holds in any model of T,,. In 
particular this formula holds for the nonstandard model M, and so the result now 
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follows by substituting the (nonstandard) constant(s) c for the variables w, since the 
last formula then asserts that T has a smallest element, say b, forcing b - 1 to be a 
largest element both of F and of F. (For further details, see [17, pp. 142-1461.) 
Therefore, neither F nor N can be recursive in the model M. 
We conclude by showing that still-another-simple-sets exist. 
4. CONSTRUCTION OF STILL ANOTHER SIMPLE SET 
4.1. THEOREM. There exists a still-another-simple-set. 
4.2. DEFINITION. Let T be an infinite set. A function f is said to majorize T if 
(Vn)[f(n) 2 t,,], where to, t ,,... are the members of T in strictly increasing order. 
4.3. DEFINITION. A set T is hyperimmune if and only if T is not majorized by 
any total recursive function. A set S is hypersimple if S is recursively enumerable and 
$ is hyperimmune. (It should be clear from the definition that hypersimple sets are 
undecidable. See [32] for further discussion.) 
The notation which we use will be standard: 
PO9 v11, qz,...: a provably acceptable indexing of the partial recursive functions, 
w,, w,, w, ,...: the domains of these functions, 
@Jo, @, , Q2 ,...: a “nice”, provable Blum measure for oo, o, ,... (We assume 
throughout that this measure behaves like Turing machine time.) 
( , ): a primitive recursive pairing function. That is, ( , ) maps N2 one-to-one and 
onto N and is strictly monotone in each of its arguments. 
rc, , x2 : primary projection functions for ( , ). (See [ 241 for details concerning 
(,)and7r,andrr2.) 
Our construction uses a movable markers argument. At stage n of the construction 
each marker, A, (k s n), will be positioned next to a unique integer pk. As long as A, 
remains active we will be looking for a ‘$(k)-sequence” for v,,(~) which can be made 
to satisfy (l)-(4) of Definition 2.1. If such a sequence, or the initial portion of such a 
sequence, can be found it is placed into a “Protect Set” for k. At any given stage of 
the construction the elements of S consist of exactly those elements which are not in 
a Protect Set but are bounded above by an element of some Protect Set. 
Stage 0: 
Place A, next to 0 making p. = 0; 
Place p. into Protect, ; 
Deactivate A, ; 
This completes stage 0. 
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Stage s (s > 0): At the beginning of Stage s we have markers A,, A,,..., A,_, which 
are positioned beside integers pO, p, ,..., pS_ 1, respectively. 
Fork=Otos-ldo 
If A, is active Then 
If pk & Protect, Then 
Place pk into Protect, ; 
If n,(k) = 0 Then Deactivate A,; 
If x <pk and x has not been placed into S and x & Uj<k Protectj 
Then place x into S. 
Set z = max element of Protect, ; 
Compute o+,(z) for s steps; 
[That is, until pPnlckj (z) 1 or @n,(kj(~) = s whichever happens first.] 
If a)nl&4 1 and K,(~) is honest and monotonically increasing for z6 Then 
Place (P_(~)(Z) into Protect,; 
If 1 Protect, I= x2(k) Then Deactivate A, ; 
If z < x ( o,&z) Then Place x into S; 
If 3j,, > k such that pi, 5 pn,(kj(z) Then 
[Vj kJ,,, Aj must be moved and Protecti emptied] 
Forj=j, to s- 1 do 
[Reactivate Aj as follows] 
Place Aj next to v,&z) t-j making pi = a),,(,Jz) tj; 
Empty Protecti. 
Activate A, by placing A, next to pS_ I t 1. 
This completes stage s. 
The next lemmas show that S is in fact provably undecidable. 
4.4. LEMMA. S is provably still-another-simple-set. 
ProoJ We begin by proving that each marker is moved only finitely often. A 
marker can be forced to move only by a marker of lower index. Hence it suffices to 
show that each marker forces only finitely many moves of other markers. Let k be a 
fixed integer and suppose that we have reached a stage, s, at which no marker with a 
lower index than k ever forces another marker to move. Suppose that k = (i,j). Then 
A, can only force another marker to move if there is a sequence 
Pk9 V)i(Pk),"*, @(Pk) with n 51 
such that vi is honest and monotonically increasing for the sequence. At each stage in 
the construction when a new element in the sequence is discovered, A, may force 
6 We say that co,,,,, is honest and monotonically increasing for z if, 
(0 z < (P~,,&)~ 
(ii) @n,&) S c * Ivn,&)l 
for the constant c which indicates linear honesty in the complexity measure. 
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finitely many markers with higher index to move. However, if p{(p,)l, then A, is 
deactivated and never again forces other markers to be moved. On the other hand, if 
d(pk) is not defined then there is some greatest n < j such that &“(E)~) converges for 
all m 5 n. In this case A, will never force another marker to move after the stage at 
which rpl(p,) converges. By our hypothesis the markers of lower index than A, never 
reactivate A,. Hence A, only forces finitely many markers to be moved finitely many 
times. 
To show that S has the requisite properties to be still-another-simple-set, let h be 
any fixed monotonically inceasing linearly honest function which grows at least as 
rapidly as k, * x3, where k, is a constant which will be specified later. We need to 
show that for any integer n there exist elements t,, t, ,..., t, in $ such that for each 
i < n: 
(1) t,>n, 
(2) ti, 1 = WA 
(3) (VX)[t[ < X < ti+ 1 * X E S], 
(4) (vX)[X < t, & X E S * @e(X) < ti+ 11. 
Let v)~ = h and let s be a stage in the construction when all the markers having 
lower index than Ald,nl have come to rest. (Since these markers have come to rest 
they never again force A(,+ nl to move.) Since h is total, honest and monotonically 
increasing a sequence, 
P(d, n) 3 h(p(d, n))- h”(P(d, n)) 
will eventually be produced and placed into Protect{& ,,). The sequence will never be 
removed and placed into S, since by our assumption all markers of lower index have 
already come to rest. Because of the manner in which markers are introduced, p(& “) 
is greater than n. At the time when elements of the above sequence were placed into 
Protecto, ,,), the intervening integers are placed into S. Hence, if we take t, to be 
P(d, n) and ti to be h&), then (l)-(3) are satsfied. Now let e be the index of the 
procedure described above. Then the domain of (Pi = S. Examining the procedure one 
sees that it takes O(tj) steps to place t, into Protect(& ,,). At this point all elements 
less than t, which will ever be place into S have been placed there. Therefore if for all 
x h(x) > k, * x3, where k, is a constant depending on e, then Q,(x) < ti+, for all 
x ( ti which are members of S. This establishes (4). Since the above proof can be 
formalized in PA, S is provably still-another-simple-set. 1 
4.5. LEMMA. If S is still-another-simple-set, then s is hyperimmune. 
Proof Suppose not. Then there exists a total recursive function t such that t 
majorizes K Given t we can construct an honest monotonically increasing function h 
which majorizes t. h must also majorize .? so for any i there are at least i elements of 
$ less than or equal to h(i). For any x,, there are at most x,, + 1 elements of $ less 
than or equal to x,,. Suppose that x0 is the beginning of an h-sequence in R Then 
there are at most x,, + 2 elements of s less than or equal to h(x,) and there are at 
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most x,, + 3 elements of s less than or equal to h’(x,). But if h majorizes s there 
must be at least h(x,) elements of ,!? less than or equal to h(h(x,)). For any 
sufficiently large h this is not possible. Thus s can not be majorized by any total 
recursive function and is therefore hyperimmune. m 
4.6. COROLLARY. g is provably hypersimple. 
Proof: Follows directly from Lemmas 4.4 and 4.5 and the fact that Lemma 4.5 
can be proved in PA. 1 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
It is worth pointing out that when Lipton and Leivant construct the nonstandard 
models in which they obtain rapidly decidable sets, the sets themselves seem to be 
nonstandard, that is, their definitions of the sets explicitly use nonstandard constants. 
Thus when passing back from the nonstandard models to the standard model, not 
only do the fast algorithms disappear, so to do the sets which the algorithms were to 
decide. To paraphrase an early criticism of nonstandard models, [2], all that remains 
in the standard model are ghosts, both of the fast algorithms and of the now-departed 
sets which the algorithms were to decide. On the other hand, since still-another- 
simple-sets can be described by the behavior of standard programs, that is programs 
which do not use nonstandard constants in their definitions, when we pass from our 
nonstandard model to the standard model, these programs as well as the simple sets 
which they describe remain. 
In conclusion, it should be pointed out that Lipton’s results are stronger than the 
results of our main theorem in the following important way: Lipton shows that for 
every (provably) recursive set it is consistent with B to believe that either the set or 
its complement has an infinite easy to decide subset. On the other hand, our main 
theorem simply gives a small class of undecidable sets for which it is consistent to 
believe that its members are all easily decidable. Given standard incompleteness 
results, it is certainly not surprising that such sets exist. It remains to be seen just 
how large a class of standard sets can be shown to be easily decidable in models of 
theories like B or Tn,. 
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